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Abstract—In this work, we study information leakage in timing
side channels that arise in the context of shared event schedulers.
Consider two processes, one of them an innocuous process
(referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred
to as Bob), using a common scheduler to process their jobs.
Based on when his jobs get processed, Bob wishes to learn about
the pattern (size and timing) of jobs of Alice. Depending on the
context, knowledge of this pattern could have serious implications
on Alice’s privacy and security. For instance, shared routers can
reveal traffic patterns, shared memory access can reveal cloud
usage patterns, and suchlike. We present a formal framework
to study the information leakage in shared resource schedulers
using the pattern estimation error as a performance metric. The
first-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheduling policy and time-division-
multiple-access (TDMA) are identified as two extreme policies
on the privacy metric, FCFS has the least, and TDMA has
the highest. However, on performance based metrics, such as
throughput and delay, it is well known that FCFS significantly
outperforms TDMA. We then derive two parametrized policies,
accumulate and serve, and proportional TDMA, which take two
different approaches to offer a tunable trade-off between privacy
and performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that resources shared between
processes lead to covert and side channels that can leak
information from one process to another. A covert commu-
nication channel is one which is not normally intended to be
used for communication [1], infact, its existence is usually
unknown to the system designer. Covert channels are typically
used by a trusted insider with access to a secret piece of
information to covey it to an outsider. Examples of covert
channels include, embedding information in the unused header
files of network protocols [2], and two processes running on a
computer communicating with each other through the access
patterns of the shared memory [3]. In a covert channel, one
process structures its use of the shared resource in a particular
pattern so as to communicate secret information to another.
Covert channels have been studied extensively in the context
of multi-level secure systems, where they can be used to create
forbidden information flows [4], [5].
In contrast to a covert channel, in a side channel, one
process tries to learn something about the operation of another
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without the latter’s cooperation. Side channels, therefore, focus
on information that is leaked incidentally by a victim process,
rather than explicitly coded by a sender. Examples of such
channels include: an attacker non-invasively improving his
odds of guessing cryptographic keys used by a crypto-system
by observing its instantaneous power usage [6], making use of
the fact that the power usage for a certain set of CPU opera-
tions is higher than others; an eavesdropper trying to guess the
underlying communication by observing the encrypted packets
flowing across a link [7], where he makes use of the fact that
encryption does not alter the volume and timing of packets
flowing on the link.
In this work, we consider the timing side channel that
exists inside of a shared scheduler. A timing side channel is
one in which information is conveyed (leaked) through the
timings of various events. Schedulers are used in multi-tasking
systems where they dictate how a finite resource is to be
divided among several competing processes. Examples of such
systems include: hardware resources (CPU, storage, buses)
inside of a computer being shared among different processes,
multiple network streams flowing through a common router,
a cloud based shared computing infrastructure, etc.. In such
systems, the quality-of-service experienced by one user of the
system is directly influenced by the activities of the other users
of the system. For example, a sudden slowdown in web access
speeds of one user could indicate an increase in network usage
from the other users sharing the same network infrastructure.
In this manner, a shared scheduler incidentally creates a timing
side channel through which a malicious user could potentially
learn about the activities of the other users using the system.
For the remainder of this work, these systems are abstracted
out as a processor being shared by multiple users, as shown in
Figure 1. Jobs arrive from multiple users to the scheduler. The
processor can work on only one job at a time. The scheduler
queues up the incoming jobs, and dynamically decides on how
the processor time gets divided amongst these competing jobs.
In this manner, the delays experienced by jobs from one user
are directly influenced by the number, timing, and size of the
jobs issued by the other users.
Some of the commonly used schedulers are first-come-first-
served (FCFS): jobs are served in the order they are issued
to the scheduler, time-division-multiple-access (TDMA): each
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Fig. 1. An abstraction of a shared scheduling system
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Fig. 2. An event/packet scheduler being exploited by a malicious user to
infer the arrival pattern from the other.
user is pre-assigned time slots during which the processor
serves only jobs from that user, round-robin (RR): one job
is served from each of the queued up users in succession,
priority schedulers: one class of jobs are served ahead of
another class of jobs according to some pre-defined rule,
shortest-job-first (SJF): a particular type of priority scheduler
where jobs that require smaller time to be processed are
served first. Each of these schedulers is optimized to perform
well on a different performance metric, such as, throughput:
number of job completions per unit time, average delay: the
mean time difference between the job completion and the
job arrival, fairness: a metric to measure if the resource is
being distributed equally/fairly between the processes, etc..
Like any engineered system, a system designer has to make
a calculated trade-off among these conflicting metrics while
picking a suitable scheduler. We argue that while choosing a
scheduler that serves jobs from multiple non-trusting users,
one has to consider the privacy offered by it along with the
other metrics. In this work, we explore the resulting trade-offs
one has to make if privacy is taken into account.
We consider the scenario when a scheduler is serving jobs
from two users, where one of them is an innocuous user and
other a malicious one. The malicious user, Bob, wishes to
learn the pattern of jobs sent by the innocuous user, Alice.
Bob exploits the fact that when the processor is busy serving
jobs from Alice, his own jobs experience a delay. As shown in
Figure 2, Bob computes the delays experienced by his jobs and
uses these delays to infer about the times when Alice tried to
access the processor, and possibly the sizes of jobs scheduled.
Learning this traffic pattern from Alice can aid Bob in carrying
out traffic analysis attacks.
A summary of our main contributions follow.
1) Development of an analytical framework to characterize
the privacy performance of a scheduling policy. While
evaluating the privacy performance of a scheduling
policy, we consider the scenario described in Figure 2,
Alice, the innocuous user, and Bob, the malicious user,
are the only two users of the system. Arrivals from Alice
are modeled as a Poisson process. Bob, on the other
hand, is allowed to pick the time and size of the jobs
he issues to a scheduler. Furthermore, he is assumed
to know the scheduling policy being used. The privacy
offered by the policy is defined as the mean square error
incurred by Bob when estimating Alice’s arrival pattern
when he picks an optimal attack strategy. Higher the
error, the better the policy is at protecting the privacy of
the users.
2) Evaluation of the privacy metric of commonly deployed
scheduling policies. FCFS is one of the most commonly
deployed scheduling policies owing to its simplicity. It
is throughput optimal and results in minimal queuing
delay. However, by the nature of the policy, there is
a large correlation between the waiting times of jobs
of one user and the arrival pattern of the other. Con-
sequently, as shown in Section IV-C by the explicit
construction of one attack strategy, FCFS is the weakest
policy on the privacy metric. On the other hand, TDMA,
wherein the delays experienced by jobs of one user
are completely independent of the arrivals of the other,
ranks highest on the privacy metric. However, TDMA
is a highly inefficient policy in terms of throughput
and delay, especially when the traffic is varying. It is
especially inefficient when the number of users using
the scheduler is large.
3) Design policies that offer good privacy-delay trade-
offs. We design two parametric policies, accumulate-
and-serve and proprtional-TDMA which can be tuned
to trade-off performance for improved privacy. These
policies take two different approaches to achieve privacy,
one pre-distorts timing information, other pre-allocates
processor times to different users. Unlike TDMA, both
these policies are throughput-optimal.
II. RELATED WORKS
The current work was motivated by an earlier work of ours,
[8], wherein, we demonstrated that a side channel does exist in
DSL routers, wherein a network path is shared between all the
incoming packet streams. The attack is briefly described below.
The attacker sends equally spaced ping packets to Alice’s
DSL router from his home computer. He then observes the
round trip times (RTTs) of the packets. The traffic entering
Alice’s computer, and Bob’s RTTs are shown in Figure 3;
as can be observed, there is a clear correlation between the
two. The fact that DSL routers employed FCFS scheduling
aided the attack. Such an attack gives the attacker a noisy
observation of the timing and the sizes of packets entering
Alice’s computer. Although the contents of the packets are
not revealed, learning such timing information opens up the
possibility for the attacker to carry out remote traffic analysis.
Some of the instances of traffic analysis include recovery
of information about keystrokes typed [9], [10], websites
visited [11], [12], or words spoken over VoIP [13]. In all these
works, the attacker observes Alice’s traffic and uses statistical
inference techniques to carry out the attack. In [14], the authors
consider the scenario where a client is connected to a rogue
website using a TOR network, which is designed to protect
the identity of the users. The website modulates the traffic sent
to the client. The website can then try to simultaneously send
data through each of the TOR nodes and measure the delay
incurred. By correlating this delay with the traffic it sent to
the client, the website can obtain its identity, thus defeating
the purpose of TOR. While that attack is no longer viable
[15], the reason is that there are many more TOR nodes now
than they were when [14] was published, and not because the
timing based side channel has been eliminated. In [16], the
authors exploit the side channel in a DSL router to infer the
website being visited by the victim.
The increasing interest in cloud computing, wherein users
issue jobs to a shared computing platform, opens up pos-
sibilities for such an attack, and is another motivation to
study these timing side channels. In [17], the authors map
the internal infrastructure of Amazon’s EC2 cloud computing
service, and demonstrate that it is possible for an attacker
to place his virtual machine (VM) on the same physical
computer as the target’s VM. They shown that once placed
on the same physical computer, any timing channel created
by sharing of the processor can be exploited by the attacker.
In cryptographic side-channels, the attacker aims at recovering
cryptographic keys by utilizing the timing variations required
for cryptographic operations [18], [19].
While timing covert channels have been studied extensively,
most notably [20], there has been very little work in studying
timing side channels. Most of the solutions proposed to
mitigate the information leakage in side channels are system
specific. Some examples are: the most common mitigation
technique against such channels is cryptographic blinding [21],
[19]; in the context of language-based security, Agat [22]
introduces a program transformation to remove timing side
channels from programs written in a sequential imperative
programming language; the NRL Pump proposed for mitigat-
ing timing channels that arise in multilevel security systems
(MLS) when a high confidentiality processes can communicate
through Acks he sends to a low confidentiality processes [23].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we
formally introduce a system model, and the metric of per-
formance that we use to compare the privacy of different
scheduling policies. In Section IV-A, we quantify the highest
degree of privacy that any scheduling policy can guarantee,
and demonstrate that TDMA scheduling policy provides this.
We start in Section IV-C discussing an attack strategy against
FCFS policy to demonstrate that it does leak significant
information between the flows. In Section V, we discuss two
strategies for designing provably secure scheduling policies.
Finally, in Section VI, we derive the mean delay experienced
by a job when each of these policies is used, and comment on
the delay-privacy tradeoff offered by the different policies.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce formally a model of the
scheduling system, and introduce a metric which measures
the strength of the policy in preserving the privacy of the
users. The scheduler is modeled as an infinite buffer server
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Fig. 3. Real traffic on a DSL line vs. observed probe RTTs when Alice is
browsing the website www.yahoo.com
that is serving jobs from two users. The scheduler can serve
jobs at a rate of one per unit time. We consider the scenario
when one of them is an innocuous user and other a malicious
one. However, the scheduler is unaware of who is malicious
and who is innocuous; therefore any policy it picks should not
distinguish between the users. The malicious user, Bob, wishes
to exploit the queuing side channel described earlier to learn
about the pattern of jobs sent by the innocuous user, Alice.
Bob is assumed to know accurately the time when his jobs are
issued, and the time it took for the scheduler to process it, i.e.
the difference between the completion time of the job and the
time when it was issued. Knowing the delays experienced by
his jobs, Bob uses this information to guess the arrival pattern
of jobs from Alice.
The ability of Bob to successfully learn about Alice’s arrival
process depends heavily on Alice’s arrival process itself. For
example, on-off patterns are easier to detect reliably compared
to an arrival process that is less bursty. In order to ensure
that the scheduling policies we design are robust to a variety
of arrival patterns, Alice’s arrival process will be modeled as
a Poisson process of rate λ2, with all the jobs of unit size.
We do this partly because Poisson processes are known to
have maximum entropy rate among processes of a given rate
[24], and hence represent a rich class of arrival processes.
Further, the analytical tractability of Poisson processes in a
queuing system reveal the nature of fundamental trade-offs
between privacy and delay in this system. We will comment on
the case when Alice’s traffic pattern follows a general arrival
pattern later. Furthermore, we assume that Bob is aware of
the statistical description of arrivals from Alice. A policy that
guards the privacy of Alice in this scenario will also perform
well when the attacker does not know a priori this rate.
A. Measuring the strength of the scheduling policy: a privacy
metric
Alice issues unit sized jobs to the scheduler according to a
Poisson process of rate λ2. The total number of jobs issued
by Alice until time u is given by AA(u). The malicious
user, Bob, also referred to as the attacker, issues his jobs at
times tn1
.
= {t1, t2, . . . , tn}, and is free to choose their sizes,
sn1
.
= {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, as well.1 Let t′n1 .= {t
′
1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
n}
be the departure times of these jobs. Bob makes use of the
observations available to him, the set {tn1 , sn1 , t
′n
1 } and the
knowledge of the scheduling policy used, in estimating Alice’s
arrival pattern. The arrival pattern of Alice is the sequence
{Xk}k=1,2,...,N , where Xk = AA(kc)−AA((k − 1)c), is the
number of jobs issued by Alice in the interval ((k − 1)c, kc],
referred to as the kth clock period of duration c. Nc is the
time horizon over which the attacker is interested in learning
Alice’s arrival pattern.
The privacy offered by a scheduling policy is measured
by the long run estimation error incurred by Bob in such a
scenario when he is free to choose the number of jobs he
issues, times when he issues them and their sizes, subject to a
maximum rate constraint, and when he optimally estimates
Alice’s arrival pattern. Formally, the privacy offered by a
scheduling policy is defined to be:
Ec,λ2Scheduling policy = limN→∞ min
n,tn1 ,s
n
1 :
n∑
i=1
si
Nc <1−λ2
N∑
k=1
E
[(
Xk −E
[
Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1
])2]
, (1)
where, the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of
the arrival times of Alice’s jobs, the arrival times and sizes
of jobs from the attacker and his departure times. This joint
distribution is in turn dependent on the scheduling policy used,
which is known to the attacker. Finally, the attacker is assumed
to know the statistical description of Alice’s arrival process,
and he is allowed to pick
n∑
i=1
si/Nc, the average rate at which
he issues his jobs, to be any value that is less than 1 − λ2,
so as to keep the system stable. A scheduling policy is said
to preserve the privacy of its users if the resulting estimation
error is high.
A game-theoretic viewpoint of the privacy metric: The
optimal value of the estimation error can be viewed in a
game theoretic framework as a saddle point between the
scheduler and Bob; Bob’s task is to minimize estimation
error, and the scheduler’s task is to maximize it. However, we
force the scheduler to play first and announce the scheduling
policy before the attacker chooses an attack strategy. This
is motivated by practical considerations. In most system, the
scheduling protocol is known to the users apriori. Further, in
side channel attacks, it is not possible for the scheduler to
1We have also worked on a version of this problem where the attacker is
also forced to issue jobs only of unit size, refer [25]. The present work is
therefore a generalization of the former.
identify a malicious user and tailor the policy accordingly.
Consequently, this assumption empowers the attacker and
the achievable privacy would be a benchmark for attackers
equipped with lesser information.
Our motivation for using the minimum mean squared error
as a metric of performance is as follows. The minimum
mean squared error, as considered in this paper, does not
conform to a specific adversarial learning technique, but serves
as a universal lower bound over all adversarial strategies
taking into account the complete available information for the
entire duration of the system operation. A natural alternative
metric would be to measure the information leakage us-
ing Shannon’s equivocation lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
k=1H(Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 ).
While entropy serves as a measure of uncertainty, which
guarantees a minimum probability of error for an adversary
(Fano’s inequality), MMSE bounds the actual error incurred.
The purpose of quantifying privacy is to have a meaningful
measure of how breachable a system is, and in that respect,
both these measures provide that interpretation. Furthermore,
the two metrics are related in the sense that both MMSE and
entropy are functionals of the probability mass function of the
same conditional random variable, Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 . MMSE is
the variance of the random variable, while equivocation is the
entropy of the random variable. It can be shown, using proof
techniques similar to those in [26], that large estimation error
does correspond to large entropy, although the relationship
between the two is not monotonic.
In the subsequent section, we provide a bound on the max-
imum estimation error an attacker could incur, demonstrate
that TDMA scheduling policy ensures that the attacker incurs
this error. Subsequently, we present a scheduling policy that
achieves an estimation error close to the maximum estimation
error at the cost of a limited increase in delay.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF FCFS AND TDMA ON THE
PRIVACY METRIC
In this section, we prove that the FCFS and TDMA are two
extreme policies on the privacy metric, FCFS offers the least
privacy while TDMA offers the highest.
A. An upper bound on the estimation error of the attacker
In order to gauge the amount of information that the attacker
learns through this side channel, it is important to first study
the amount of information that the attacker has even before
performing any attack. In our case, the attacker is assumed to
know the statistical description that governs the arrival pattern
from Alice, that it is a Poisson traffic of rate λ2. In this section,
we compute the estimation error incurred by the attacker when
he uses just this statistical description to estimate Alice’s
arrival pattern. This is the maximum estimation error that a
rational attacker can incur, and will also serve as a benchmark
to test the efficacy of a scheduling policy in preserving Alice’s
privacy.
Theorem 4.1: Irrespective of the scheduling policy used, the
maximum estimation error that the attacker can incur is λ2c.
Proof: When Alice’s traffic is a Poisson λ2 traffic, the
number of arrivals in between two clock ticks, Xk, is a
Poisson random variable with parameter λ2c. Also Xks are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Ignoring all
the observations available to him, viz. {tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1}, if Bob
estimates Xk with its statistical mean, λ2c, for all k, the mean
estimation error incurred by him is equal to the variance of
the Poisson random variable, which is λ2c.
Define
Ec,λ2Max .= λ2c. (2)
≥ Ec,λ2Scheduling Policy (3)
Making a clever use of his observations, the attacker can
potentially perform a better job at guessing Alice’s arrival
process, thereby incurring a lower estimation error. A good
scheduling policy should have an estimation error as close
Ec,λ2Max as possible.
B. Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) policy achieves the
maximum privacy
If the scheduler uses a Time-Division-Multiple-Access
(TDMA) policy, it allocates dedicated time slots to process
jobs from each user. For instance, when there are only two
users, the scheduler could assign the odd time slots to serve
jobs from the first user, and even time slots to process jobs
from the other. If there are no unserved jobs from one of the
users, the scheduler just idles in the corresponding time slots.
For such a policy, the arrival pattern of one user does
not influence the completion times of jobs in the other. In
this scenario, the attacker can do nothing better than use his
knowledge of the Alice’s arrival statistics to guess the arrival
pattern. Therefore, the estimation error incurred would be
Ec,λ2TDMA = λ2c. This means that from an privacy perspective,
TDMA is an optimal albeit impractical scheduling policy.
The high privacy offered by TDMA comes at a significant
performance cost in terms of throughput and delay. First,
note that the policy is not throughput optimal [27], [28]. By
throughput optimality, we mean the following. Suppose there
are m users using the scheduler to process their jobs, and
user i issues unit sized jobs at a rate λi, and the scheduler
can process 1 unit of job in a unit interval of time. It can be
shown that the system stays stable, i.e., the queue sizes do not
blow to infinity, for any values of the input rates as long as
they satisfy
m∑
i=1
λi < 1 if the scheduler uses the FCFS policy.
However, if the scheduler used TDMA, then for the system
to be stable, we would require λi < 1/m, which significantly
shrinks the rate region over which the system stays stable.
Second, even if the arrival rates from users are such that the
system stays stable, as user’s job patterns are rarely periodic,
they would therefore incur severe delays. The delay issues are
further discussed in Section VI.
C. FCFS offers the least privacy
The FCFS scheduling policy serves jobs in the order in
which they arrive. Although this policy is easy to implement,
and fares well in the metrics of throughput and mean delay,
as we will demonstrate, it does not perform well in terms
of preserving the privacy of a user. For the system model
considered here, the following theorem can be proved. It states
that the estimation error incurred by the attacker when FCFS
scheduling policy is used is equal to zero when the attacker
issues his jobs at a high enough rate.
Theorem 4.2: FCFS policy offers no privacy to its users.
Specifically, for a fixed arrival rate from Alice, λ2, the
estimation error incurred by the strongest attacker is equal
to zero. That is,
Ec,λ2FCFS = 0. (4)
Proof: We prove this theorem by specifying one particular
attack strategy, i.e., one set of arrival times and sizes of the jobs
from the attacker which guarantees zero error. The attacker
issues one job every c/dce time units, where dce is the smallest
integer greater than or equal to c. The size of each job is
λc/dce, so that the rate at which he issues jobs is equal to λ.
Therefore tk = kc/dce and sk = λc/dce. Let t′n1 be the depar-
ture times of his jobs, and X˜k be the number of jobs issued
by Alice in between times (k − 1)c/dce and kc/dce. Recall
that Xk is the number of jobs issued by Alice in between
times (k−1)c and kc. Therefore, Xk =
dce∑
i=1
X˜(k−1)dce+i. This
means if the attacker estimates the sequence {X˜k} accurately,
he can estimate the sequence {Xk} accurately as well. Note
that the time between successive arrivals from the attacker
is c/dce < 1. The size of a job from Alice is 1. Hence
the attacker can accurately learn whether Alice issued a job
between two of his jobs or not. His estimation procedure is
the follows.
Consider first the scenario when t
′
k−1 < tk, that is, his
k− 1th job departs before the arrival of kth job. In this case,
suppose X˜k = 0, then t
′
k = tk+ sk, i.e., the k
th job goes into
service immediately upon its arrival. This scenario is shown
in Figure 4. On the other hand, if X˜k > 0, shown in Figure 5
then tk + sk + X˜k − 1 < t′k < tk + sk + X˜k, which implies
X˜k = dt′k − (tk + sk)e.
Now, suppose t
′
k−1 > tk, i.e., if the k − 1th job from the
attacker departs after the arrival of his kth job, shown in Figure
6. In this case, X˜k = t
′
k − sk − t
′
k−1.
Clearly, X˜k is a deterministic function of tk−1, t
′
k−1, tk, t
′
k
and sk. Therefore, the attacker incurs zero error in estimating
Alice’s arrival pattern.
Next we present some remarks about the result derived
above. For the attack strategy specified in Theorem 4.2, the
attacker incurs 0 error independent of his rate. This means that
the attacker can estimate Alice’s arrival pattern exactly even
when he is permitted to issue jobs at an arbitrarily small rate.
This is the case because Alice’s jobs are of size 1 and as long
as the attacker issues jobs at a frequency greater than 1, he
can estimate Alice’s arrivals exactly. Note that the size of jobs
issued by him can be arbitrarily small.
As an aside, the result of the theorem can easily be extended
to the case when the job sizes of Alice are of arbitrary sizes
(k−1)c
dce
kc
dce
t
′
k−1 t
′
k
X˜k = 0
Fig. 4. This is the scenario when t
′
k−1 < kc/dce and X˜k = 0. In this
scenario, t
′
k = tk+sk . In the figure, the solid upward and downward pointing
arrows denote the arrival and departure times, respectively, of attacker’s jobs.
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Fig. 5. This is the scenario when t
′
k−1 < kc/dce and X˜k = 1 > 0. In
this scenario, X˜k = dt′k − (tk + sk)e. In the figure, the solid upward and
downward pointing arrows denote the arrival and departure times, respectively,
of attacker’s jobs, and the dotted arrows represent the jobs from Alice. The
size of the arrow is proportional to the size of the job.
(for example, when the job sizes from Alice are exponentially
distributed). The attack strategy in such a scenario would be
the follows. The attacker issues one job every δ units of time,
and the size of each job is λδ. His estimate of Alice’s arrivals
is the follows. If t
′
k−1 < tk and t
′
k = tk+sk, then he estimates
the number of arrivals from Alice between times tk−1 and tk
to be zero. If t
′
k−1 < tk and t
′
k > tk + sk, then he estimates
the number of arrivals from Alice between times tk−1 and tk
to be t
′
k−(tk+sk). And finally if t
′
k−1 > tk, then he estimates
the number of arrivals to be t
′
k − sk − t
′
k−1. Like before, his
estimation is accurate in the third scenario. However, in the
first two scenarios, he could incur some error. Nonetheless,
the error is bounded by δ2. Therefore, by choosing δ small
enough, the attacker can incur close to zero estimation error.
This suggests two possible alterations to the FCFS policy
which could lead to a higher estimation error for the attacker.
First, the policy could limit the frequency at which a user
can issue jobs to the system, by imposing a minimum inter-
arrival time. This could be done by having a token-bucket filter
[29]. Second, the scheduler could impose a restriction on the
smallest size of a job, perhaps by idling for a short while after
serving a small job. While these mechanisms look promising,
it is easy to see that they hurt the performance of the system
in terms of a smaller throughput region (if the scheduler starts
idling) and/or adding to the overall delay. As we shall show
in the following section, one can design secure scheduling
policies without sacrificing any of the throughput region.
To sum up, FCFS offers very little privacy to its users. On
the other hand, TDMA offers the highest levels of privacy,
albeit at a high performance penalty (in terms of delay and
(k−1)c
dce
kc
dce
t
′
k−1 t
′
k
X˜k = 2
Fig. 6. This is the scenario when t
′
k−1 > kc/dce. In this scenario, X˜k =
t
′
k − t
′
k − sk . In the figure, the solid upward and downward pointing arrows
denote the arrival and departure times, respectively, of attacker’s jobs, and
the dotted arrows represent the jobs from Alice. The size of the arrow is
proportional to the size of the job.
throughput). In the following section, we propose a paramet-
ric scheduling policy which provides a controlled trade-off
between delay and privacy.
V. PROVABLY SECURE SCHEDULING POLICIES
In this section, we derive two policies that are resistant
to any attacks that the attacker might possibly launch. The
first policy, accumulate and serve pre-distorts the arriving
traffic before serving them. This erases the fine grained timing
information that the attacker can learn. The second policy takes
a different approach. TDMA leaks no information of one user’s
arrivals to the other because slots are statically reserved ahead
of time. The second policy, proportional TDMA, uses this same
principle to guarantee minimal information leakage, however,
it is designed so that these reservations alter adaptively at a
slow rate so as to minimize delays incurred by the users. We
discuss these two policies in the following.
A. Accumulate and Serve Policy
The Accumulate and Serve policy is shown in Figure 7. In
this policy, the scheduler accumulates all the incoming jobs
in its buffer for a period of T time units. It then serves
all the accumulated jobs from user 1, followed by all the
accumulated jobs from user 2, followed by those from user
3, and so on. In the two user scenario discussed before, user
1 could be the attacker, or Alice. If serving all these jobs
takes M units of time and if M < T , then the scheduler
idles for the remaining T −M time before beginning to serve
the accumulated jobs. The intuition for such a policy stems
from the fact that buffering destroys the timing information of
the arrival times of the jobs, thereby reducing the amount of
information that can be extracted by the attacker. The attacker
can therefore learn, at most, the total number of jobs that
arrived from Alice in the accumulate period, and nothing more
fine grained. Our subsequent analysis will make use of this fact
to show that this policy provides guaranteed levels of privacy
to Alice, irrespective of any attack that can be launched by
Bob. Using Foster-Lyapunov stability theorem, it can be shown
that the scheduling policy is stable when the sum of rates from
all the users is less than 1 (refer Appendix B).
  
Switch 1 
Switch 2 
flow 1 
flow 2 
Fig. 7. Pictorial representation of the accumulate and serve policy. The
switches close every T time units. All the accumulated jobs from user 1 are
served followed by jobs from user 2. The two flows correspond to jobs issued
by the two users.
B. Analysis
Theorem 5.1: A lower bound on the privacy offered by the
accumulate and serve policy is given by,
Ec,λ2AccServe ≥ λ2c
(
1− c
T
)
+
= Ec,λ2Max
(
1− c
T
)
+
, (5)
Proof: A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.
Some remarks about the consequences of Theorem 5.1:
• The accumulate and serve policy guarantees a certain
level of privacy regardless of the attacker strategy. Fur-
thermore, if the accumulate period is chosen to be large
enough so that cT  1, then the estimation error incurred
by the attacker gets increasingly close to the maximum
estimation error, which is what he would have incurred
by just using the statistics of Alice’s arrival. The price
paid for choosing a very large value for T is of course
the delay experienced by jobs. Delay analysis is carried
out in Section VI. When T is chosen to be 5 times c or
greater, the ratio is greater than 0.8, irrespective of the
attacker’s strategy.
• It is important to note that the error does not depend on
the strategy employed by the attacker. In particular, it
does not depend on the rate at which the attacker issues
his jobs, which seems unusual. This is a consequence
of the result in Lemma A.1, which says that when the
attacker is given minimum additional information (by
a genie) about total number of jobs in an accumulate
period, his arrival and departure times carry no additional
useful information for the purpose of estimation. The rate
at which attacker issues his jobs, however, does determine
the gap between true estimation error and the genie aided
error.
• The bound EcMax
(
1− cT
)
+
evaluates to 0 when c ≥ T ,
which is not very useful. However, we are mostly inter-
ested in the scenario when T is chosen to be large enough
to guarantee a degree of protection against a given value
of c.
C. Proportional TDMA (p-TDMA) Policy
As stated before, TDMA achieves the highest privacy be-
cause the times at which the attacker gets served is known
to him a priori, he learns nothing by performing the attack.
The p-TDMA policy builds upon this idea. In the two user
scenario, the policy divides time into slots, and at time 0, the
policy statically assigns all odd numbered slots to user 1 and
even numbered slots to user 2, just like TDMA. At the end
of an adaptation period L, the policy computes the empirical
rates at which the two users have been issuing jobs to the
scheduler, λˆ1 and λˆ2. Between times L and 2L, each time
slot is reserved for user 1 with probability λˆ1
λˆ1+λˆ2
, and user 2
with probability λˆ2
λˆ1+λˆ2
. At time 2L, the scheduler recomputes
the empirical rates, and uses the new rates to decide whether
to reserve a slot to serve user 1 or user 2. The policy continues
to update the empirical rates every L time units. The idea is
that the policy eventually learns the true rates at which the
users issue jobs, and allocates times in proportion to these
rates, thus reducing the delays incurred.
Theorem 5.2:
Ec,λ2p−TDMA ≥ Ec,λ2Max
(
1− c
L
)
+
. (6)
Proof: The analysis is very similar to that of the ac-
cumulate and serve policy. The policy depends only on the
empirical rates at which jobs are issued to the scheduler. If
the attacker is given the side information about how many
jobs Alice has issued in each adaptation period, his arrival
and departure times carry no further information and can be
discarded. The result follows.
Some remarks about this policy follow:
• Unlike the accumulate and serve policy that trades off de-
lay for privacy, the p-TDMA policy trades off adaptation
time for privacy. Larger the value of the adaptation period
L, longer it takes for the policy to learn the true arrival
rates. However, for stationary arrival processes, the long
run average delay is independent of the duration of the
adaptation period. The reason for this is the follows.
Irrespective of the value of L, after sufficient number
of adaptation periods, the empirical rates converge to the
true rates, and stay that way. Therefore, in the long run,
the delay experienced by the jobs is independent of L.
In theory, by choosing a large enough value of L, this
policy is guaranteed to perform close to TDMA on the
privacy metric without the excessive delay penalty.
• In a practical system, if the arrivals are not stationary, i.e.,
the statistical description of the arrival process changes
with time, or if a user issues jobs only for a short duration
which is insufficient for the policy to learn the true arrival
rate from him, the delays incurred by the user can still be
large. One would have to choose the value of L wisely to
strike a balance between the performance for short flows,
and the privacy it offers.
VI. DELAY ANALYSIS
The delay experienced by the jobs would depend on the
total number of users of the system and the specific patterns
of arrivals from them. For purposes of delay comparison, we
will consider a scenario where all the users of the system
have time invariant arrival statistics. This would be the delay
incurred when all users are legitimate innocuous users. This
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Fig. 8. Privacy-delay trade-off offered by different policies. DFCFSDPolicy
measures the performance of a policy in terms of delay offered by it, higher
the ratio, the better.
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measures the privacy performance of the policy,
higher the better. We consider the case when two users use the system, one
user issues jobs at a rate 0.2 and the other at 0.45. By varying the parameters
associated with each of the two derived policies, we obtain curves for the
accumulate and serve and p-TDMA policies. The value of c, the clock period,
is set to two.
is a reasonable assumption, as during the ‘normal’ mode of
scheduler operation, when there are only legitimate users using
the scheduler, the policy should offer as minimum delay to the
jobs as possible. We will consider the case where there are M
users of the system, traffic from user i being a Poisson traffic
with parameter λi, size of all the jobs being equal to 1 time
unit. Define λ =
∑M
i=1 λi. We will compute the average delay
of a job (averaged over all the jobs from all the users) for each
of the policies discussed here.
Theorem 6.1: The mean delay experienced by a job for
FCFS, TDMA, accumulate and serve and p-TDMA scheduling
policies are as follows:
DFCFS =1 + λ
2(1− λ) , (7)
DTDMA =1 + M
2
+
M∑
i=1
λi
λ
λiM
2
2(1− λiM) , (8)
DAcc Serve ≤1 + λ(T + 1)
2
+
λ+ T (1− λ)2
2(1− λ) I{λ>λ∗T }
+
√
λT I{λ<λ∗T }, (9)
Dp-TDMA =1 + 1
2(1− λ) +
M − 1
1− λ . (10)
where, λ∗T =
2T+1−√1+4T
2T .
Proof: A detailed proof is given in Appendix C.
Some remarks about the mean delay computed:
• For FCFS, accumulate and serve, and p-TDMA, the mean
delay is finite, equivalently the system is stable when the
sum of the rates from all the users is less than 1, i.e.,
λ =
∑M
i=1 λi < 1. However, for TDMA, the mean delay
is finite only when the rate from each user is less than
1/M , i.e., when λi < 1/M . Therefore, TDMA loses out
on multiplexing gains.
• lim
λ→1
DAcc Serve
DFCFS = 1, i.e., at high traffic loads, the mean
delay offered by the accumulate and serve policy is
equal to that when FCFS policy is used. In the other
extreme, lim
λ→0
DAcc Serve
DFCFS = 1+
T
2 , which can be quite large
especially if T is chosen to be large. For TDMA, the same
limit would be 1 + M2 . For p− TDMA, it is 1/2 +M .
Depending on the values of M and T , either TDMA or
accumulate and serve might offer the least delays.
• In Figure 8, we plot the privacy offered by each of these
policies vs the inverse of the delay offered by them. We
consider the case when two users use the scheduler, one
of them issues jobs at a rate 0.45 and the other at rate
0.2. FCFS offers the least delay but also the least privacy,
while TDMA offers the highest privacy, but at the expense
of a significant performance loss. Accumulate and serve,
as discussed earlier, is a parametrized policy that can
trade-off privacy for delay. On the other hand, the p-
TDMA policy can be tuned to achieve highest privacy
without affecting the delay performance at all. However,
longer the adaptation period, longer the arrival streams
from the users have to be for the higher initial delays to
average out.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we discuss the timing side channel that
arises naturally when two processes share a common resource.
We consider a system where jobs from two users arrive
at a processor. The task is to find a scheduling policy for
the processor that minimizes information leakage about one
user’s job arrival pattern to the other while not significantly
increasing the average delay seen by the jobs. We use the
estimation error to quantify the information leak, and use
it to demonstrate that the first come first served scheduling
policy leaks significant information. We also propose two
scheduling policies that provide guaranteed levels of privacy.
Do these policies continue to be secure if the arrivals were a
general arrival process instead of being Poisson? To answer
this question, note that the operation of both these derived
policies depend on the number of arrivals in a batch (in one
accumulate period, or one adaptation period). Therefore, as
long as the arrival process from Alice is such that, given the
total number of arrivals in an accumulate/adaptation period,
there is a large uncertainty in the arrival times of each jobs,
the derived policies will still fare well.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Suppose that n jobs from Bob arrive in K accumulate
periods. Let {B1, B2, . . . , BK}, denoted in short by BK1 , be
the number of jobs arriving from Alice in accumulate periods
1, 2, . . . ,K respectively. BK1 is the side information given
to the attacker. The following lemma shows that the side
information is the maximum information the attacker can hope
to learn.
Lemma A.1: If the attacker is given the side information
BK1 , the arrival and completion times of his jobs carry no
information and can be discarded. Let Xk be the random
variable denoting the number of jobs that arrive from Alice in
between clock ticks k− 1 and k. The conditional expectation,
E(Xk|tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 , B
K
1 ) is the same as E(Xk|BK1 ).
Proof: Consider the conditional probability distribution
Pr(Xk|BK1 , tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 ). If accumulate and serve policy is used
at the scheduler, the departure times of Bob’s jobs are just a
function of the arrival times and the size of his jobs, and the
sequence {B1, B2, . . . , BK}. Therefore,
Pr(Xk|BK1 , tn1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 )
=
Pr(Xk, B
K
1 , t
n
1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 )
Pr(BK1 , t
n
1 , t
′n
1 , s
n
1 )
=
Pr(Xk, B
K
1 , t
n
1 , s
n
1 )
Pr(BK1 , t
n
1 , s
n
1 )
Pr(t
′n
1 |Xk, BK1 , tn1 , sn1 )
Pr(t
′n
1 |BK1 , tn1 , sn1 )
= Pr(Xk|BK1 , tn1 , sn1 ), (11)
where (11) follows because t
′n
1 is a function of t
n
1 , s
n
1 and
BK1 . As a consequence, the three sets of random vari-
ables {tn1 , sn1} − BK1 − {Xk}} form a Markov chain. Thus,
Pr(Xk|BK1 , tn1 , sn1 ) = Pr(Xk|BK1 ).
As a result of Lemma A.1, if the attacker is given BK1 ,
the conditional distribution of Xk, and hence the resulting
estimation error he will incur, is independent of the timing and
number of jobs that the attacker sends. Also, if the resulting
estimation error is denoted by Ec,BK1AccServe, then, from (??),
Ec,λAccServe ≥ Ec,B
K
1
AccServe. (12)
This is because, we are giving the attacker extra information
which is not directly available to him. With this information,
the attacker can only be better off in his estimation procedure.
Hence, Ec,BK1AccServe bounds the estimation error that the attacker
incurs, and we will shortly show that this is large enough.
Next, we turn our attention to computing Ec,BK1AccServe.
We first consider the case when the following hold:
C1 The accumulate period, T , is an integer multiple of
c, the duration of a clock period.
C2 At time 0, the first clock tick aligns with the start of
the first accumulate period.
If conditions C1 and C2 are met, every clock period is then
completely contained within an accumulate period.
Suppose that the clock period k is contained within the
accumulate period m. Let Xk denote the number of arrivals
from Alice in clock period k, and let Xk denote the number
of arrivals from Alice in the other clock periods in accumulate
period m. Then, it can be shown that, conditioned on the
total number of arrivals in accumulate period m, Bm, Xk
is independent of the arrivals in the other accumulate periods.
Therefore, Pr(Xk|BK1 ) = Pr(Xk|Bm). For a Poisson process,
conditioned on the total number of arrivals in a given period,
the arrival times themselves are uniformly distributed in the
period [30]. Therefore, conditioned on Bm = βm, the distri-
bution of Xk is a Binomial random variable with parameters
(βm,
c
T ). Given the value of βm, the best estimate for Xk is
then cT βm. Thus, the estimation error incurred by the attacker
in a slot in which βm jobs arrived is equal to the variance of
the Binomial random variable equal to Eβm = βm cT
(
1− cT
)
.
Given that βm itself is a random variable, we need to average
over its distribution to get the estimation error incurred by the
attacker. βm is Poisson with mean λ2T , and the estimation
error in a typical clock period is
Eβm [Eβm ] = Eβm [βm
c
T
(
1− c
T
)
]
= λ2c
(
1− c
T
)
= EcMax
(
1− c
T
)
, (13)
where (13) follows from (2).
When the conditions C1 and C2 do not hold, it can be
shown the estimation error incurred by the attacker is greater
than EcMax
(
1− cT
)
. It can be shown that the empirical average
of the estimation error incurred in a clock period, as given
in (13) is also equal to the time average of the estimation
error incurred by the attacker, which, as defined in (1) is the
privacy metric we are interested in. Therefore, Ec,BK1Acc Serve =
EMax
(
1− cT
)
.
The case when c > T : If c > T , then the side information
BK1 of the attacker is finer than the information which he
wishes to extract from Alice’s arrival process. Therefore, in
such a case, the estimation error incurred by the attacker is
equal to zero. Recall that in reality the attacker does not have
this side information, and he has to infer it based on the
arrival and departure times of his jobs. We are not interested
in analyzing this case as we expect that in a system design,
the accumulate period will be chosen to be sufficiently larger
than c.
APPENDIX B
STABILITY OF THE ACCUMULATE AND SERVE POLICY
Let Qn be the number of jobs waiting to be served at the
beginning of the nth accumulate period, i.e., at time nT−.
Because T is an integer multiple of the service time, note
that there are no jobs with partially completed service at this
time, and therefore the total work in the system at the end
of accumulate period is always an integer. Let An denote the
total number of jobs that arrive from all the users in the nth
accumulate period. Then, Qn is a Markov chain with the state
space Z+, and state update equation given by
Qn+1 = (Qn +An − T )+, (14)
where the notation (i)+ stands for max{0, i}. This is because,
along with the jobs already waiting to be served at time nT−,
An number of jobs arrive. Out of these, at most T of them get
served in the accumulate period. The stability of this queue
also implies that the mean waiting times of the jobs is always
bounded as long as the sum of arrival rates from all the users
is less than the service rate.
For a state q ∈ Z+, define the Lyapunov function to be
V (q) = q2/2. We will use Foster-Lyapunov’s theorem to
show that the Markov chain is positive recurrent. Let λ be
the sum of the arrival rates. Consider the case when each of
the arrival process is a Poisson process, then the cumulative
arrival process is a Poisson process as well. An is then a
Poisson random variable with parameter λT . Given Qn = q,
the expected value of the drift is given by
E[V (Qn+1)− V (Qn)|Qn = q]
= E
[
((q +An − T )+)2 − q2
2
]
≤ 1
2
E
[
(q +An − α)2 − q2
]
, α ≤ T (15)
=
1
2
(
(q − α)2 + λT + (λT )2 + 2λT (q − α)− q2
)
=
λT + (α− λT )2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
− (α− λT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
q, (16)
where (15) follows because, for real numbers i, α, β, ((i −
β)+)
2 ≤ (i − α)2,∀α ≤ β. By setting α to T , the condition
for the system to be stable translates to λ < 1. This is because,
if λ < 1, then K2 > 0, and therefore the expected drift of the
Lyapunov function is negative for q large enough.
Furthermore, one can bound the mean number of jobs in
the queue in the steady state by
E[Qn] ≤ K1
K2
=
λT + (α− λT )2
2(α− λT ) . (17)
The bound in (17) holds for all values of α in the range
(λT, T ]. Choosing the value of α that results in the tightest
bound, it can be shown that
E[Qn] ≤
{√
λT if λ < λ∗T
λ+(1−λ)2
2(1−λ) if λ ≥ λ∗T
, (18)
where λ∗T =
2T+1−√1+4T
2T .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
The FCFS system is a simple M/D/1 queue, and the mean
delay can be derived from Polleczek and Khinchine’s formula
for the M/G/1 system, refer [31]. For the proof for TDMA,
refer [32]. The proof for accumulate and serve and the p-
TDMA policies follow.
A. Mean delay of accumulate and serve policy
The arriving jobs are stored in the buffer till the start of the
next accumulate period. A job, chosen at random gets delayed
by T/2 time units at this stage. From the point of view of
the processor, the inputs to the queue are batch arrivals which
arrive every T time units, and the size of a batch is a Poisson
random variable. The average delay across all jobs does not
depend on the order in which jobs are served by the server,
as long as the server does not idle. For delay analysis, we can
therefore assume that the server serves these jobs in FCFS
manner. In reality, recall that the server serves all the jobs
from one user followed by all the jobs from the other user.
Let Ak denote the size of the batch that arrives at the end
of the accumulate period k and Qk be the number of jobs
that are not yet served at the end of period k. By the FCFS
assumption, Qk is also the time the arriving batch waits before
it gets served. The queue update equation is given in (14), and
consequently, the bounds derived in Appendix B hold. There-
fore, the mean waiting time before a batch of jobs starts getting
served is upper bounded by λ+(1−λ)
2
2(1−λ) I{λ≥λ∗T }+
√
λT I{λ<λ∗T }.
In order to compute the mean delay experienced by a job,
first note that a job drawn at random from the first K jobs,
where K is a large number, has a higher chance of belonging
to a bigger batch than a smaller one. In fact, the probability
that a job drawn at random belongs to a batch of size b is
given by bP(Ak=b)E[Ak] . Given that the job is from a batch of size
b, the mean number of jobs ahead of it can be shown to be
b−1
2 , consequently, conditional on the batch size to be b, the
job has to wait for an additional time of b−12 time units after
the batch starts service before it can get served. Averaging
over b, we can get the additional waiting time of a jobs drawn
at random before it gets served to be∑
b
b
Pr(Ak = b)
E[Ak]
(
b− 1
2
)
=
E[A2k]−E[Ak]
2E[Ak]
=
λT
2
(19)
Once it gets to service, the service time of the job is a fixed
1 time unit. Therefore, the delay experienced by a job drawn at
random, which is the mean delay of offered by the scheduling
policy is bounded by (9).
B. Mean delay of p-TDMA policy
If the arrival process from each user is a Poisson process of
rate λi, in the steady state, the empirical arrival rates converge
to the true arrival rates. User i gets service in a time slot
with probability λi/λ. Let Qn be the number of unserved
jobs from user i at the beginning of time slot n. We then have
the following queuing equation,
Qn+1 = (Qn −Dn)+ +An,
where An denotes the number of job arrivals between times
n and n + 1, which is a Poisson random variable with mean
λi, and Dn is a Bernoulli random variable which takes the
value 1 if user i gets served in time slot n, which happens
with probability λi/λ, or 0 otherwise. The queuing equation
holds because, the system serves only jobs that have already
arrived by time n in time slot n.
In the steady state, both Qn and Qn+1 have the same
distribution. Let qi
.
= Pr(Qn = i) = Pr(Qn+1 = i),
and Q(z) .=
∞∑
i=0
qiz
i be the Z-transform of the steady state
distribution. We then have
Q(z) = E[zQn+1 ] = E[z(Qn−Dn)++An ] (20)
= q0E[z
An ]
(
q0E[z
(−Dn)+ ] +
∞∑
i=1
qiE[z
i−Dn ]
)
=
q0(λi/λ)e
λi(z−1)(1− z−1)
1− (1− (λi/λ) + (λi/λ)z−1)eλi(z−1) , (21)
where (20) follows from the queuing equation. Use the fact
that lim
z→1
Q(z) = 1 to solve for q0 = (1 − λ). The mean
number of unserved jobs from user i in the steady state is
then equal to
∞∑
i=0
iqi = lim
z→1
Q˙(z), which can be computed.
Using Little’s law to relate the average queue length to the
mean delay experienced by a job from user i, and averaging
it across all users of the system, we get the result given in
equation (10). The result also includes the time 1/2, the mean
time an arriving job waits before the nearest multiple of one
time unit.
